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INTRODUCTION
The problem of corruption has been one of the major
areas of inquiry among many scholars for a long time now
because of its broad impact to the political and economic
situations of a country. Corruption is commonly defined as
the misuse and abuse of public office for private gain
(UNDP, 1997). According to Nye (1976), this act involves a
complex range of practices which encompasses behavior
which deviates from the formal duties of public role.
However, De Guzman et al., (1979) assert that the parties
involved in corruption may be internal or external to the
bureaucratic organization.
Corruption is considered pervasive and a universal
problem afflicting developed and developing countries
alike (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Pedro Jr., 2001). In fact,
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argued that the structures and
political processes of weak governments result in high
corruption levels especially in the developing countries.
Corruption is considered today as anti-development, being
the primary obstacle to social and economic growth in poor
countries (UNDP, 1997: Andvig et al., (2000) despite its
functional side. Mauro (1993), for instance, found out that
countries with higher levels of corruption have lower ratio
of both total and private investments to GDP.  The com-
plex nature of this phenomenon necessitates the determi-
nation of its context, nature, characteristics, patterns and
organizational structure in effectively addressing the prob-
lem.
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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to explore the involvement in graft
and   corruption among elective barangay youth
officials in a city in Southern Philippines. Using a
qualitative research design employing   a case study
method, 10 informants were included in this study
and were selected using snowball sampling tech-
nique. The findings indicated that the informants were
aware of the forms of graft and corrupt practices
stipulated in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act in the Philippines (RA 3019) and other legal
documents. However, despite this, most of them
admitted to have been involved in any of the follow-
ing irregular acts while in public service:  malversa-
tion of public funds, evasion of public bidding in
the purchase of supplies and equipments, forgery,
bribery, making ghost projects and payrolls, abuse
of powers, among others. It was known also that
corruption was caused mainly by bureaucratic dys-
functions especially in the delay of budget releases
and political socialization with older and corrupt
barangay officials who passed on the techniques of
corruption to the young leader informants. The policy
implications of the study demands further   strength-
ening of governmental structures and processes that
would ensure observance of   good   governance
among public officials both at the barangay ( local)
and national levels.
KEYWORDS: barangay, bureaucratic dysfunction,
graft and corruption, political socialization,
Sangguniang Kabatataan
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In the Philippines, corruption is rampant. The
Transparency International 2010 report says that
the level of corruption in the Philippines has
worsened in the last three years, with the country
being perceived as 12th most corrupt in a field of
178 nations (http://cpi.transparency.org.).
According to Amorado (2007), the corrupt
bureaucratic structure   of the national govern-
ment has penetrated the local government unit
(even at the barangay level which is the base and
smallest political unit of the country) upon the
implementation of the 1991 Local Government
Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 7160).
Under this law, the barangay local government
unit (BLGU) was then able to receive its annual
internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the na-
tional government. The devolution of power to
the LGU was believed to produce empowerment of
the political base of the country.
The youth through the Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) has been highly encouraged to participate in
politics and governance starting at the barangay
level and gets 10 % of the barangay IRA. The SK
council comprising of 1 chair and 7 members are
elected by the youth voting population 15 to 17
years old. The council appoints among its members
a secretary, treasurer and committee heads. The
Philippine government is the only nation in the
world which has a mechanism of involving the
youth sector in governance (UNDP, 2007). This is
in response to the call of the United Nations’
Convention on the Rights of Children to create an
avenue wherein they can actively   represent their
sector in the affairs of the local government and in
the country as a whole.
The need to examine the experiences of these
elected youth leaders especially their involvement/
non-involvement in graft and corruption deserves
scholarly attention since this is an unexplored area
of study based on literature of corruption in the
Philippines reviewed by the authors
(Madlangbayan, 2008; Aban, 2009; Laut et al.,
2012, Javier, 1998).  The participation of the youth
in local governance is a good starting point to
examine whether these youth leaders have imbibed
the ideals of clean government or, just like the
involvement of traditional political leaders in
corruption; they too are following the same path.
This study intends to examine whether the
youth leaders in Iligan City are involved in graft
and corruption practices at the barangay level.
Specifically, this study  aims to obtain  information
on  the following: roles  of the SK in  local gover-
nance, budgetary allocations,  notions of graft and
corruption, nature/type of graft and corruption
practices   experienced  ,   their reasons for  in-
volvement/ non-involvement in corruption  prac-
tices,  the people involved , extent of corruption
undertaken,  and their perception as to how this
practice  affects them at the personal level and the
SK organization level/youth governance.
In this study, there are two approaches used in
understanding corruption. The first one is to view
this practice   at the agent-actor level being the one
who defines his experiences from his own perspec-
tive. In this approach, Homan’s exchange theory
and Bandura’s social learning theory are used as
tools for understanding corruption practices.
Exchange theory conceptualizes social interaction
as an exchange of tangible or intangible goods and
services, ranging from food and shelter to social
approval or sympathy. People choose to participate
in an exchange after they have examined the costs
and the rewards of alternative courses of action
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and have chosen the most attractive choice (Ritzer,
2000).  The more satisfied they are with the out-
comes of exchange, the more likely they are to
repeat their participation.  Involvement of the SK
members in corruption is assumed to be the   result
of repeated actions in the past or deprivations that
direct them to do the act in anticipation of a goal
which could be money, property and other desired
ends.  On the other hand, how is corruption
learned? It is through the assumptions laid down by
Bandura that can supply the possible answer.
According to him, “Most human behavior is
learned observationally through modeling: from
observing others, one forms an idea of how new
behaviors are performed, and on later occasions
this coded information serves as a guide for action”
(Bandura, 1969).
The second approach is to look at corruption at
the organizational level.  In this approach, corrup-
tion could be seen as a dysfunction of an ideal
bureaucratic structure governed by rational leaders
that are guided by the values of logic, efficiency and
reason. Corruption is argued to be the antithesis of
the bureaucratic objective towards attaining effi-
ciency, calculability, and predictability in decision
making. Bureaucratic laws, rules and regulations
derived their legitimacy from the consistent,
disciplined, rationalized and methodical calculation
of optimum means to given ends (Weber, 1947).
On the other hand, corruption may operate in a
different manner as it is usually governed by
collusion and secrecy that is, hidden from public
view. However, the objective conditions set by the
organization or society may be very stringent that
people are unable to   obtain their goals using
institutional means. Using Merton’s anomie
theory, the anomic person may become an innova-
tor in his conscious desire to obtain an end which
he could not fulfill through legitimate means. Thus
in a bureaucratic set up, this person may resort to
illegal means, hence corruption, because opportu-
nities offered to him in the organization to obtain
a goal is thwarted or limited by bureaucratic regula-
tions (Merton, 1957).
The schematic diagram below shows that the SK
as an organization has defined roles and budgetary
allocations in the barangay which could serve as
the starting point to analyze the structural condu-
civeness of the SK to corruption. At the personal
level, the SK informants have notions about the
forms of graft and corruption that exist not only in
the local/ barangay level but also in the govern-
ment bureaucracy. Similarly, their personal profile
(age and SK position) might have relevance in their
participation in corruption being young or not
receiving monetary incentive relative to their
position. These organizational and personal condi-
tions are assumed to contribute certain weights on
the reasons of their   involvement/non-involve-
ment in graft and corruption viewed in the follow-
ing dimensions: form of corruption undertaken,
people involved in the act and extent of involve-
ment in terms of the monetary rewards obtained.
Their perception of the effects of   their involve-
ment in corruption personally (like values and
motivation) and organizationally (role performance
and budgetary aspects, etc.) define the meanings
they constructed based on their experience in
public service.  This is helpful in   understanding
how corruption might end, being passed on or
fermented in the minds of these   young leaders
who could possibly be the future leaders of the
country.
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RESEARCH METHODS
This study utilized a qualitative approach em-
ploying a case study method. Primary information
was derived from 10 key informants comprising of
5 SK chairs and 5 SK councilors who served office
from 2007-2010 and were selected through snow-
ball sampling method. They were also mostly
college students, single, 20 years old and served 3
years (full term) in their position.  Out of the 44
barangays in Iligan City, 10 were included out of
which 6 are urban and 4 are rural barangays
represented each by   these   10 key informants.
The identity of the barangays and informants were
secured through assigning them with fictitious
names to abide with the ethical principles in
conducting research.  Informed consent was also
secured prior to the interview proper.  Content
analysis was the method used in organizing and
classifying data and   thematic approach was also
employed in the data analysis.
Table 1 below shows the profile of the barangays
in the study showing their income (IRA), popula-
tion, land size and SK allocation which is 10 %
share of the IRA of mother barangay.  IRA is
determined according to population size and land
area of the local government unit, in this case, the
barangay. As shown in the table, the top 4
barangays with the highest IRA are urban and
FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF THE STUDY
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(with the exception of Barangay GO and HD
which are urban) the rest are rural.
DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS
1. BUDGET ALLOCATION AND ROLES OF THE
SK OFFICERS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE
Before discussing the roles of SK, it is significant
to present its budget allocation and distribution as
basis for us to understand the source of corruption
in the organization. Aside from the 10 % IRA
received by the SK from the general fund of the
barangay (Sec.329, 2001 SK By-laws), it can also
hold fund-raising activities (Sec. 426c) or solicit
contributions (Sec. 433b). The breakdown of the
SK budget is as follows:  Green Brigade program (
10%),   Capability building program ( 10%), Anti-
drug abuse campaign program( 10 %) , 58% for the
Development programs such as education, health,
disaster and calamity management, sports, infra-
structure and legislative work,  and 2% for the
Annual dues for the SK National Federation
program (Source: 2001 SK Constitution and By-laws ).
SK is mandated by its Constitution and By-laws
to initiate programs designed to enhance the
social, political, economic, cultural, moral, spiritual,
and physical development of the members. How-
ever, upon examination of the research data, it was
noted that there is often a disparity between the
youth’s most pressing needs and interests, such as
livelihood and education, and the SK’s projects
which tend to focus more on sports, culture, and
the environment. SK should also promulgate
resolutions necessary to carry out the objectives of
the youth in the barangay but the responses indi-
cated that the SK’s performance in the legislative
function was generally weak.  However, it is inter-
esting to note that Clean Brigade program, educa-
tion program in the form of Lakbay Aral (educa-
tional exposure of SK) and sports activities become
the major sources of corruption in the SK.
TABLE 1. PROFILE OF THE BARANGAYS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Source: Department of Interior and Local Government, Iligan City, 2007
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2. NOTIONS ABOUT GRAFT AND CORRUPTION
Awareness about graft and corruption practices
is prevalent among the informants. In fact, they
believed that corruption is part of an organization/
system making it an inevitable and normal daily
operation. They argued that even the well-meaning
political leaders cannot avoid corruption. Graft
and corruption practices can be in the form of
overpricing the cost of office supplies, kickbacks,
forging signatures, false transparency,  abuse of
power, stealing  public money, bribery, malversa-
tion of funds, ghost projects,   getting late in a
meeting, among others. Corruption is bad, but it is
needed for the survival of a political career (like
stealing government money to buy votes) or getting
away from bureaucratic red tape and inefficiency.
The Philippine government bureaucracy is
ridden with corruption that pervades in all levels,
that is from the national to the local government
up to the smallest political unit which is the
barangay. They considered this practice as unfair
because only the politicians enjoy the government
resources while the majority of the Filipinos are
wallowing in poverty. However, corruption cannot
be avoided but can be minimized through laws.
3. REASONS FOR INVOLVEMENT IN GRAFT
AND CORRUPTION PRACTICES
Except for one SK councilor who was strong-
willed and had spared himself from committing
the act, nine of the key informants said that they
were involved in graft and corruption during their
terms. Corruption was resorted to by these young
public officials because of the benefits it offered to
them; making money or saving them from an
unfavorable situation (especially budget deficits
during travels). The personal motivation to engage
in corruption occurred among them especially if
they get monetary incentive for their involvement
or if they want to retrieve the personal money they
had taken from their pocket especially on the part
of the SK chair who shared his honoraria with the
SK councilors. Since it  is only the SK chair who
receives a monthly honorarium  equivalent  to the
honorarium given to  barangay councilors, the SK
councilors also feel that they all deserve an incen-
tive from the SK funds.  This is the reason why
they find any possible means to get money and
compensate for their efforts/labor during their
term   through conducting irregular activities that
will surely yield monetary returns.
Organizationally, corruption happens because of
delayed budgetary release of a forthcoming project,
as source of honorarium for the SK councilors,
purchase of much needed materials needing
immediate funding or to facilitate the release of
urgent papers, among others.  In particular, the
illegal nature of the act involves secrecy on the part
of the participants since it could become a reason
for blackmailing the involved parties in the future
once the SK official refused to enlist his involve-
ment in the illegal activity.  The Clean Brigade
fund is the usual funding source   for the hono-
rarium of the SK councilors the amount of which
varies by barangay. In here, there is interplay of
both personal motives and organizational loop-
holes that find its way to corruption. The moral
judgment of the informants is generally weak
because they were young then. All these would
have implications to the kind of moral recovery
and educational programs to be directed at the
institutional levels which should start at the family.
On the other hand, modifying legal provisions in
the operation of the SK organization may address
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the organizational conduciveness of the SK to
corruption.
4.  TYPE OF CORRUPTION UNDERTAKEN
The following discussions involve a categoriza-
tion of the corruption practices done by the infor-
mants while in office. The classification may
overlap but the common denominators of all of
them are dishonesty/fraud, abuse of power, ab-
sence of transparency and integrity.
a. Embezzlement/Diversion of Funds
Some amount of the budget in the SK allocated
for a particular purpose is diverted to other uses.
This comes in the form of purchasing laptop for
the money originally allotted for books, using
budget for the SK council tour for the tour of the
SK chair’s family, or using money intended for the
payment of Clean Brigade cleaners to offset the
deficit in the conduct of cultural activities. These
practices are commonly identified in the local and
national studies on   corruption that had been
done so far (Madlangbayan, 2008; Aban, 2009;
Laut et al., 2012, Javier, 1998).
b. Payroll Padding/Ghost Employment
In order to obtain honorarium for the SK
councilors which is not provided by law of any
monetary benefit while in office, the money is
taken from the 10%   Clean Brigade fund. This is
done by preparing a proposal for   the conduct of
an environmental cleanup activity where the
budget for the workers is stipulated. This proposal
is going to be endorsed by the SK council (with
their signatures) to be submitted for approval of
the mother barangay. In some barangays, the SK
members will personally do the cleaning and had
to prepare their daily time record (DTR) for their
services in order to be paid. In others, they simply
hire people to do the labor but they include their
names in the list of workers without having to
personally engage themselves in the activity. The
SK members involved will collect their salary
together with the salary of the ghost workers they
listed in the payroll. The amount involved ranged
from Php 1,000.00 to Php 4,000.00 monthly.
In the law, it was not permitted that the SK
chair will receive a double compensation. What
one SK chair did was to list his younger brother’s
name in the payroll but he was the one who
collected the amount. If we look at the  at em-
bezzlement and payroll padding  as forms of cor-
ruption practices,  the anti-corruption laws in the
Philippines especially Section 3, paragraph (b) of
RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines  strictly prohibited the conduct of these
acts among public officials.
 Looking at the situation from the theoretical
stance of Merton, these practices are the result of
the failure of the bureaucracy to provide the SK a
constitutional provision that allows the SK council
to obtain monetary benefit for their involvement
and participation in youth governance. Because of
this, they look for manipulative ways to get what
they want through payroll padding and related
means.
c. Fraud During Travel/Tours And abuse of
Power
Falsification of public documents occurred
during travels/tours of SK officers. In order to save
on the travel cost and offset travel budget deficit,
over declaration of expenses was commonly ob-
served in the liquidation of expenses for transpor-
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tation and foods, and other items stipulated in the
itinerary. In certain occasion, the SK chair pock-
eted the travel budget of the SK councilors who
joined a tour which is a clear case of abuse of
power.
There were situations in the conduct of cultural
activities wherein the SK members played corrup-
tion by charging entrance fees but the proceeds
were not liquidated but, instead, were divided
among themselves.
d. Fraud in the Award of Contract: Overpricing,
Absence of Public Bidding and Kickbacks
Corruption is costly to the government re-
sources if mismanaged. The law provides that a
public bidding shall be conducted in purchasing
government supplies and equipment in order to
pick up the lowest bidder. This is the juiciest form
of corruption since the corrupt official simply looks
for a supplier of a good to be purchased and awards
the contract without bidding in anticipation of at
least 10 % commission from the supplier. A piece-
meal purchasing strategy whereby small quantities
of supplies are bought in continuous process is
resorted to by the canvasser in order to do away
with the bidding process. Because it took some
times for the payment to be given especially if the
budget is delayed, the supplier usually charged an
overpriced cost of the items in order to cover up
for the commission of the canvasser. However,
there was also a case when overpricing of items was
done in order to get money to pay for the services
of the sports referee whose honorarium was missed
in the budget.
The process described above, violates the re-
quirement in Open Public Bidding in the Award-
ing of Contract (Sec 3, RA 3019). It is also a moral,
social and cultural problem in a society that per-
petuates personal dealings through the practice of
reciprocity, debt of gratitude and patronage. In the
language of Amorado (2007), he called these
cultural breeders of corruption especially with the
tendency of the Filipinos to utilize connections to
facilitate “fixed” transactions.
R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Stan-
dards for Public Officials and Employees) has more
comprehensive provisions on conflict of interest.
The law and its implementing rules say that public
officials cannot have a direct or indirect financial
or material interest in any transaction requiring
the approval of their office. An official is said to
have a financial or material interest if s/he is a
substantial stockholder, member of the board, or
officer of a corporation (Coronel and Tirol, 2002).
e. Prize Manipulation and Forging Signatures
Prize manipulation usually happened when
budget proposal for the SK cultural/sports event is
not approved. This is done by not giving the exact
amount of prizes to the winners so that the extra
money then could be used in other events, or they
can pocket it. In the voucher,   a higher amount is
indicated but in the awarding of prizes, the winners
will receive only lower amount.  What will be
passed to the treasurer for liquidation report will
be a forged voucher in order to hide the anomaly.
In another case, the fund for the Clean Brigade
was released involving an amount of Php16,
000.00 without the knowledge of the SK    council.
This amount was intended for an activity which
the mother barangay never permitted the SK to
undertake.  So the SK chair forged the signatures
of the SK members in the payroll so that he can
get the money.
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The above cases are in violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b) of R.A 3019. Also, these practices are
considered criminal acts as defined by article 171,
Section IV of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines. In fact, some barangay officials in
Iligan City are already sued for violating these
provisions based on the reports of the informants.
f. Corruption in the Use of Government Proper-
ties
There seems to be a failure among the young
public officials to distinguish what is a private and a
public property.  According to Rose-Ackerman
(1978), corruption is an interface of the public and
private sectors or in the language of Heidenheimer
et al. (1989), the transaction between these sectors
makes the actors illegitimately convert public
goods, which are collectively owned, into private
goods.  As gathered, majority of the SK council
members   looked at public properties purchased
during their terms as their own.  For example,
most of them used personally the laptop of the
office, motorbike, cellular phone, sports equip-
ment, school supplies, computer set, among others.
In fact, a few admitted to have subdivided among
themselves and brought home parts of a computer
set to include a monitor, CPU and printer. There is
failure on their part to consider public accountabil-
ity in governance especially in the use of public
properties for official purposes. The Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines and the previously stipu-
lated laws (RA 3019 and RA 6713) cited provisions
for defining acts of public officials which are
punishable under these laws.
g. Bribery
Bribery could occur in three levels. The first
level is for the SK chair to bribe the SK councilors
so they would approve his/her project proposal.
The next level is for the SK chair, with or without
the participation of the SK councilors, to bribe the
barangay officials (the barangay chair, treasurer or
head of the finance committee) for their approval
of an SK project proposal. However, in order that
the liquidation of the money released would not be
problematic, the next level is for the SK chair/
council to bribe the personnel or auditor of the
Commission of Audit (COA) for a smooth sailing
approval of the liquidation report.  The COA
being the financial watchdog of the local govern-
ment unit (LGU) is strict about how the finances
are allocated and spent. Once the COA questions
the liquidation report, future budget releases of the
LGU, including the SK, would be suspended. For
instance, in the previous example cited on the
“secret” release of P16, 000.00, the SK chair bribed
the barangay treasurer and chair of the barangay
finance committee for their approval.  He was also
able to seek approval from COA that some funds
under the Clean Brigade program will be con-
verted as SK councilors’ honorarium. In most
cases, if there were projects that needed to be
rushed, some amount shall be given to the   Com-
mission on Audit (COA) auditor and workers   in
order to facilitate the transaction. Sometimes,
aside from the ‘grease money” given,   material
things like cakes during birthdays, roast pig
(lechon) are demanded in exchange for the ap-
proval of the transaction.
Bureaucratic corruption involves outright
robbery of the treasury (kleptocracy). This situation
is aptly captured by Mushtaq Khan who looks at
corruption as “behavior that deviates from the formal
rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a
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position of public authority because of private motives
such as wealth, power, or status” (Khan 1996:12). In
the Philippine case, an ordinary citizen cannot
grossly rely on the transparency and accountability
of public officials because even the watchdogs   of
the financial resources of the government like the
COA personnel are parties in corruption.  The
network of support established by the youth lead-
ers, which could be considered as their social
capital, becomes the breeders of corruption. The
bribed party   allowed illegal activities of the SK
officials in order for them to obtain   personal gain
from the anomalous transaction. When viewed at
a macro perspective,   Hope (2000) argues that
widespread corruption is a symptom of a poorly
functioning state, failure of ethical leadership,
democracy and good governance. However, it has
to be stressed that the Philippines is not bereft of
laws that protect the resources of the government
and to fight against corruption. The only problem
is the aggressive implementation of these laws   by
imposing grave penalties on violators caught.
5. PEOPLE INVOLVED CORRUPTION AND
THEIR PARTICIPATION
As cited earlier, those involved in corruption are
public officials in the barangay  who are involved
in the monetary transactions of the SK as approv-
ing officers like the SK council, barangay treasurer,
barangay chair and head of the barangay finance
committee. These are the horizontal connections
or the local corruption network.  Private individu-
als are also involved like the supplier of goods for
public use. On the other hand, the COA is consid-
ered as an inter-agency corruption partner respon-
sible for the audit of the liquidation report of the
SK official.
6. EXTENT OF MONETARY INVOLVEMENT
 This study was able to document that an SK
official got at least Php 500.00 to Php 144, 000.00
after serving 3 years in the office. The SK chairs
have higher monetary involvement than the SK
councilors because the latter have limited access to
the financial resources of the barangay. Other SK
councilors got Php 1,000.00 to Php 4,000.00
monthly the amount of which was taken usually
from the Clean Brigade fund. On the other hand,
the SK chair got Php 25,000.00 to more than
P100, 000.00 aside from his honorarium from the
mother barangay. This would indeed indicate that
huge amount of money is really lost to corruption
which the Transparency International (2010)
estimated to be 20% of the Philippines’ annual
budget.  If translated to monetary terms, this is
equivalent to Php 250 billion a year (http://
www.transparencyreporting.net).
7. THE BREEDERS OF CORRUPTION
Transmitters of the culture of corruption were
identified in the study. These persons could be
fellow SK or barangay officials, notably the
barangay treasurer, or COA personnel. They
taught the informants the mode of operation in
doing corruption. The techniques involved in
doing the act  include getting the right connections
and false transparency because it is mandatory that
all the paper transactions done in support of
money embezzled  shall appear legitimate.   Also,
the informants claimed that they were taught,
helped, and protected by the above-mentioned
corruption partners.
Corruption is also learned by the informants
themselves when they faced some problems to
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finance their activities or tempted not to report
the money they collected from income-generating
activities like solicitations and entrance fees for
sports and cultural activities. They reported that
corruption is a matter of a change of attitude- from
being guilty at first to being comfortable with it
every time you do it. Furthermore, learning cor-
ruption from a parent who is a barangay official
also surfaced. The corruption networks cited above
are indeed startling facts as these would mean
dismantling the complex avenues for corruption
which cut across institutional spheres, including the
family.
8. PERCEIVED EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION IN
GOVERNANCE
At the personal level, corruption is seen by the
informants both in the positive and negative
angles. The immediate personal monetary gain
plus their realization that corruption is part of the
system make them lenient about the practice. The
others admitted that they were then young, vulner-
able and lacked wisdom that is why they committed
the act. On the other hand, some believed that in
whatever form and reason, morally, corruption is
bad—and politics is the dirtiest game to play. In
fact, the people who said this would not engage in
politics anymore having seen how corruption had
plagued politics.
At the organizational level, corruption saves the
SK a few times especially when faced with budget
deficits, delayed budgetary releases, or obtain
budget for the SKs honorarium. The bureaucratic
delays and legal restrictions forced the SK officers
to find for viable but illegitimate means to operate
under limited resources and difficult circumstances.
The integrity and accountability of the young
public officials   are adversely affected because of
the organizational loopholes and structures that
promote the practice of graft and corruption in the
barangay local government unit.
CONCLUSION
Corruption has many facets, causes, reasons and
functions in various contexts. Worldwide corrup-
tion is seen by Hope (2000) as symptom of poorly
functioning state, failure of ethical leadership,
democracy and good governance. Among the
young public officials in the study, their involve-
ment in corruption is just a reflection of a bigger
national corruption problem of the Philippine
government which could be the result of moral
decay, misuse of public power, and weak gover-
nance.   Sad to say, these youth leaders are not
spared from this problem as they are a microcosm
of the national situation. Young leaders as they are,
they are now following the tracks of corruption
laid by the older political officials in the barangay.
Their public consciousness and   idealism which are
the   basic ingredients in sparking the zest for
political change, responsible leadership and moral
transformation are now at stake.
The theoretical assumptions posed in line with
Homan’s exchange theory, has found some sup-
port in the data. For instance,   the estimation of
rewards (financial gain) outweighs the costs (like
guilt) in participating into the corruption practices.
Also, those involved in the act of corruption are
considered innovators (using Merton’s typology)
who wanted to obtain a goal (like money, public
goods) by not following the institutional means.
The ideals of bureaucracy as advanced by Weber
are challenged by corruption. In this study, corrup-
tion even facilitated efficiency and prompt service
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that derails/dismantles bureaucratic red tape.
Corruption also circumvents the law in favor of
the corrupt actors since the rigidity and legality in
the operations of the bureaucracy is hard to pen-
etrate.
However, despite the upside of corruption to the
bureaucratic operations, its downside is devastating
at the macro level. Corruption is costly on the part
of the government. The money lost to corruption
could have been used for productive projects that
benefit the poor. The overlap of private and public
sectors result in plunder of public goods.  Corrup-
tion that involves the government’s internal
control, audit, and financial watchdogs result in
financial drain of the limited budget of the local
government units, including the SK.
This study has implications to strengthening the
campaign against corruption thereby promoting
good governance as   subsumed in the   platforms
of   the Aquino administration. Democratic partici-
pation of the people, civil society organizations,
non-government organizations, and media, among
others could facilitate exposures of corruption
among government leaders as bold moves to curb
the act. Amendment in the SK constitution and by-
laws to address issues on transparency and account-
ability, leadership morals and ethics are of primary
importance in order to teach these young leaders
the value of responsible and clean government.
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